Upcoming Event

(Title to be announced) – 12 Sep 2025

Date: 12 September 2025 (Friday) Time: 1530 – 1700 Venue: Room 10.13, 10/F, Seminar Room, Run Run Shaw Tower, Centennial Campus, HKU Registration: Here Speakers: Prof David Thorstad, Philosophy, Vanderbilt University Abstract: Recent years have seen increasing concern that artificial intelligence may soon pose an existential risk to humanity. One leading ground for concern is

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April 26-27, 2025 – Workshop in Philosophy & AI at Peking University

  The Peking University, Beijing Normal University and The University of Hong Kong has jointly organised a workshop on Philosophy and AI, funded by the Research Funds for Excellent Interdisciplinary Research Groups at Beijing Normal University. Dates: April 26-27, 2025Venue: Berggruen Institute China Center, No. 54 Yannan Garden, Peking University, Beijing Host Department of Philosophy

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Artificial intelligence and destabilized moral concepts

Date: April 11, 2025 (Friday) Speaker: Professor Regina Rini Associate Professor Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Moral and Social Cognition Department of Philosophy, York University PhD, New York University, 2011 B.A., Georgetown University, 2004 Canada Research Chair in Social and Moral Cognition and Associate Professor of Philosophy. Research background in moral psychology, ethical theory,

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What’s hidden inside predictively successful deep learning models?

Abstract: In recent work, I argued that there is an AI-specific no miracles argument (NMA) which is at least as plausible as the traditional NMA. In this talk, I will express two doubts about this claim, relative to the AI-specific NMA that I previously proposed. I will then develop a new AI-specific NMA in response,

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Counterfactual Explanations in AI: A Tension between ‘Causality’ and ‘Plausibility’

Abstract: Making AI explainable has become an increasingly urgent demand, and one of the popular approaches is to generate so-called counterfactual explanations. In this talk, I attempt a philosophical critique of the key aspects of this approach, and raise an important challenge arising from a tension between two constraints on a good counterfactual explanation in

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